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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of household shocks on the incidence and intensity of
child labor in rural Malawi. Intensity is measured as the reported number of sessions that a
child was working. Probit and zero-inflated negative binomial estimates fail to provide
evidence in support of the hypothesis that child labor increases in response to the occurrence
of shocks.
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Child labor and its potential causes have been subject to increased scrutiny in the 
economic literature in the past decade. Various hypotheses exist as to what explains the 
relatively widespread incidence of child labor in the developing world. The oft-
mentioned cause is poverty, whereby subsistence living compels households to augment 
conventional resources with child income (Basu and Van, 1998).   
 
A related but relatively recent strand of the literature points out that child labor may vary 
by households’ ability to respond to unexpected income shocks. In economies that lack 
formal credit and insurance markets, households can increase child labor supply to buffer 
the effects of negative shocks, very much like they can do with sales of assets, running 
down savings and informal social networks of transfers and loans. Child labor allows 
households to partially offset income loss directly—through child wage income—or 
indirectly—by freeing up adult labor from household work or chores. According to this 
hypothesis, all else equal, increases in child labor incidence and/or intensity should be 
associated with households that have experienced such negative shocks.  
 
Few studies have tested such hypothesis. Guarcello et al. (2003), Duryea et al. (2003) and 
Beegle et al. (2006) examine child labor response to household shocks in Guatemala, 
Brazil and Tanzania, respectively.  Other studies have shown the effects of shocks and 
uncertainties on child schooling (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000; Fitzsimmons, 
2003). 
 
In this study, the response of child labor to shocks is examined using a unique panel 
dataset from Malawi. Shocks are measured as incidences of death and illness/accident in 
a household, and self-reported changes to overall household well-being. The use of 
indicator variables representing occurrences of sickness, unemployment, death and such 
is favored in the literature because it likely obviates bias arising from measurement errors 
and endogeneity (e.g. in income) (see for example, Cochrane, 1991; Guarcello et al., 
2003 and Duryea et al., 2003 provide applications in child labor analysis). Subjective 
measures of well-being are also used in the risk-sharing literature to assess household 




The data come from the Malawi Rural Financial Markets and Household Food Security 
surveys conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 
collaboration with the Rural Development Department of Bunda College of Agriculture, 
Malawi. The surveys were conducted in three rounds from February to December 1995 
on 404 households in forty-five villages in five districts. Detailed information was 
collected on various activities of households and members including demographics, asset 
ownership and transactions, credit access and labor supply. 
 
Information on child labor supply was collected on 7-11 year-olds residing in the sample 
households. In particular, households gave detailed accounts of the activities of children   2 
 
at different times in the two days before the survey (in each round). The specific blocks 
of time (or sessions, for the purposes of this study) that households were inquired on are 
7-10am, 10-12am, 12-3pm and 3-6pm. Exact accounts of children’s activities in each 
session ranged from non-labor activities like playing or resting, to various household 
chores and nonmarket work, to wage-earning labor. 
 
For the purposes of this study, responses on each session were recoded to reflect the 
activity of a child as labor versus non-labor. Based on such recoding, two variables were 
constructed to measure the incidence and intensity of child labor. The incidence variable 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a child was involved in labor activity at least for 
one session and zero otherwise. The intensity variable is a count that measures the 
number of sessions a child was reported as working (ranging from 0-8 sessions). 
Measuring both incidence and intensity is important because presumably households can 
respond to shocks by engaging [formerly] non-working children in work or by increasing 
the amount of work done by [already] working children.  
 
We use four proxies for shocks. The first three are indicators of shock occurrences in the 
household: a dummy variable which equals 1 if a household experienced death of a head, 
zero otherwise; a dummy which equals 1 if a household experienced death of a member, 
zero otherwise; a dummy which equals 1 if a household experienced at least one 
illness/accident, zero otherwise. The fourth is based on a household’s own assessment of 
well-being as measured by self-reported ‘number of positive events in the household 
between rounds’. Again a dummy variable is constructed equaling 1 if a household 
reported at least one positive event and zero otherwise. If the hypothesis holds, the first 
three shock indicators should enter a child labor equation positive and significant while 
the positive event dummy should be negative and significant.  
 
In measuring the impact of shocks on child labor, we control for a large array of child and 
household characteristics that provide useful insights into the determinants of child labor. 
After excluding observations with missing data, the final pooled sample consisted of 936 
children. Summary statistics on relevant variables are given in Table 1. 
 
3. Estimation and Results 
 
Child labor incidence is estimated using a Probit model of the likelihood that a child 
works as a result of shocks in the household. In the model, we control for a large set of 
child and household characteristics that potentially affect the probability that a child 
works. These include sex, age, relationship to head, and schooling of child; head’s sex, 
age and education; and household characteristics—size, number of children under age 6, 
dependency ratio, occupation/livelihood and access to credit. Even after controlling for 
this set of characteristics, child labor could be affected by household unobservables (e.g. 
attitude towards risk) that may be correlated with various observables and, if not 
controlled for, could cause bias in estimated coefficients. To address such concerns, we 
use the longitudinal structure of the data to allow for household heterogeneities and 
report random effects probit estimates in addition to the pooled model. The results are 
presented in Table 2.    3 
 
The results show that there is no evidence of increase in the likelihood that a child works 
as a result of the occurrence of shocks. In fact, of the four shock variables, only death of a 
member and illness/accidents in the household are significant but have opposite to the 
expected sign. The likelihood that a child works decreases when there is 
sickness/accident or death of a member experienced by the household. While these 
results are contrary to the insurance hypothesis, they are robust to controlling for 
household random effects.  
  
The other variables that have significant effect on child labor incidence are child’s sex 
and age, female headedness, spouse’s education, number of dependents below the age of 
six and credit access. Female children are 19 percentage points more likely to work 
compared to males. Older children are also more likely to spend time working. 
Interestingly, the likelihood of child work decreases, on average, by 16 percentage points 
if the household head is female. Similarly, spouse’s education (which can for the most 
part be interpreted as mother’s education) reduces the likelihood that a child works.
1 
Household’s access to credit decreases probability of work by 6 percentage points.  
 
As noted above, next we estimate whether shocks increase the amount of child labor. For 
this a count model of the number of sessions of child work is estimated. Over the two 
days of inquiry, a child can engage from zero (no work at all) to 8 sessions of work. The 
summary statistics in Table 1 show that in the pooled sample, about half of the children 
did not work at all while the average number of sessions of work was 1.6. In estimating 
count data models of such scenario, two issues are relevant: overdispersion (which is 
generally indicated by a count variable having a variance larger than the mean) and 
excess zeros (where a large number of observations exhibit zero counts). In our case, the 
fact that the variance (4.2849) of the count is larger than the mean (1.55) hints towards 
overdispersion. Also, the fact that half of the sample reported zero sessions of work 
implies excess zero models that allow for structural determination of the probability of 
zero occurrences along with count estimates may be more appropriate. 
 
To address both issues, we conduct appropriate statistical tests. Likelihood ratio tests 
favor overdispersion models: the negative binomial (NB) over Poisson, and the zero-
inflated negative binomial (ZINB) over zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP). Next, Vuong’s 
(1989) test of non-nested distributions shows that ZINB outperforms NB in all 
specifications. Accordingly, estimates of the ZINB model are presented in Table 3. 
 
Looking at the estimates, only one shock variable is significant in affecting number of 
child labor sessions but with a sign opposite to a priori. Here, death of the head reduces 
the number of sessions of child labor by about 40 percent.
2 In similar tune with the probit 
regressions, we fail to find evidence that household shocks cause an increase in child 
labor use. Other variables that significantly impact child labor intensity are child’s age, 
school attendance, and household land size and dependency ratio. Older children 
                                                 
1 Ideally, one would like to have child’s father’s and mother’s education. However, such information is not 
available in the surveys and, therefore, head’s and spouse’s education is used. 
2 This is computed as 100[exp(-0.509)-1] where the exponentiated coefficient, exp(-0.509), is commonly 
referred to as the incidence-rate ratio in count data models.   4 
 
typically work more sessions, while school attendance has the opposite effect. Children in 
households with larger land sizes work more. Dependency ratio mitigates child labor 





This paper tests the hypothesis that in poor developing economies where formal 
insurance mechanisms are likely to be absent, the occurrence of shocks could potentially 
induce child labor supply. Controlling for a large set of determinants of child labor, we 
find no evidence that such a relationship exists between shock proxies and child labor 
supply of 7-11 year-olds in rural Malawi. 
 
Failure to find evidence in support of the insurance hypothesis could reflect that 
households resort to other mechanisms in protecting themselves from the negative 
repercussions of shocks. What exactly these other measures are—running down savings, 
sale of assets, increase in labor supply of other adult members, labor sharing with other 
households, formal and informal loans and transfers, etc—is a future research question. 
However, the estimation results further suggest that child labor in fact decreases with the 
occurrence of some shocks. This is interesting because it could point to a variety of 
situations. For instance, it could point to an overall decrease in economic activity in 
households that are coping with death or sickness of members. On the other hand, it 
could also imply that whatever the response to such shocks, it has an overreaching impact 
in relieving children in afflicted households from labor, at least temporarily. There are 
accounts of informal insurance networks whereby sickness, accident or death in a 
household brings forth assistance in the form of labor and other resource sharing from 
network members (Scott, 1976; Platteau, 1997). Of course, such scenarios are simple 
conjectures at this stage but not implausible in closely-knit social structures as in rural 
Africa. 
 
Finally, useful insights could be derived from the other important determinants of child 
labor. The usual finding that girls bear the brunt of child labor in poor economies is 
reaffirmed. The results also suggest that increased access to schooling, women 
empowerment and household credit access are all potentially fruitful policy options in 











                                                 
3 Estimations using the number of sicknesses/accidents, deaths and positive events in the household 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Variable  Definition  Mean (Std. dev) 
D_CWRK  Worked at least one session=1 if yes, else 0  0.50(0.50) 
CSESSNS  Number of child labor sessions  1.55(2.07) 
D_CFEM  Female child=1 if yes, else 0  0.49(0.50) 
CAGE Age  8.74(1.59) 
D_CSOD  Son/daughter of head=1 if yes, else 0  0.82(0.39) 
D_CPRIM  Child has attended primary school=1 if yes, else 0  0.82(0.38) 
HHFAEQ  Household farm equipment value  199.61(538.36) 
HHLAND  Household Land in hectares  2.03(1.34) 
D_HFEM  Female head=1 if yes, else 0  0.27(0.44) 
HAGE Head’s  age  46.03(11.40) 
D_HILT  Head illiterate=1 if yes, else 0  0.21(0.41) 
D_HREAD  Head can read/write=1 if yes, else 0  0.48(0.50) 
D_HPRIM  Head completed primary school=1 if yes, else 0  0.24(0.43) 
D_HJUN  Head completed junior or above=1 if yes, else 0  0.07(0.26) 
D_SILT  Spouse illiterate=1 if yes, else 0  0.32(0.47) 
D_SREAD  Spouse can read/write=1 if yes, else 0  0.49(0.50) 
D_SPRIM  Spouse completed primary or above=1 if yes, else 0  0.19(0.39) 
HHSIZE Household  size  6.61(2.22) 
BOYS6  Population boys under 6 years  0.76(0.89) 
GIRLS6  Population girls under 6 years  0.55(0.78) 
HHDRAT  Dependency ratio-(<15 + >64)/household size  0.60(0.14) 
HHFARM  Farming household=1 if yes, else 0  0.65(0.48) 
HHCRED  Household member of a credit program=1 if yes, else 0  0.62(0.49) 
D_HDIED  Head died in past 4 months=1 if yes, else 0  0.03(0.17) 
D_MDIED  Member/s died in past 4 months=1 if yes, else 0  0.19(0.39) 
D_ILAC  Illness/accident in past 4 months=1 if yes, else 0  0.13(0.34) 
D_PEVNT  Reported at least one positive event=1 if yes, else 0  0.30(0.46) 
N   936 
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Table 2: Probit estimates of child labor incidence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pooled probit  RE probit  Pooled probit  RE probit  Pooled probit   RE probit  Pooled probit  RE probit 
D_HDIED  -0.002(0.02)  0.003(0.03)        
D_MDIED    -0.080*(1.71)  -0.082*(1.69)      
D_ILAC        -0.135***(2.63)  -0.131***(2.47)    
D_PEVNT        0.044(1.04)  0.042(0.94) 
D_CFEM 0.185***(5.33)  0.189***(5.25)  0.188***(5.40)  0.191***(5.32) 0.186***(5.35) 0.189***(5.33) 0.183***(5.25) 0.187***(5.19) 
CAGE 0.043***(3.58)  0.044***(3.55)  0.043***(3.53)  0.044***(3.52) 0.044***(3.62) 0.044***(3.61) 0.043***(3.56) 0.044***(3.54) 
D_CSOD  -0.053(1.01) -0.052(0.95) -0.060(1.15) -0.059(1.08) -0.047(0.90) -0.046(0.86) -0.054(1.04) -0.053(0.97) 
D_CPRIM  0.051(1.00) 0.059(1.10) 0.049(0.96) 0.057(1.06) 0.055(1.06) 0.060(1.13) 0.050(0.97) 0.057(1.06) 
HHFAEQ  0.003(0.69) 0.003(0.65) 0.003(0.77) 0.003(0.71) 0.003(0.85) 0.003(0.78) 0.003(0.77) 0.003(0.72) 
HHLAND  0.027*(1.71)  0.027(1.58) 0.024(1.53) 0.024(1.40) 0.025(1.56) 0.025(1.48) 0.025(1.57) 0.025(1.46) 
D_HFEM -0.162***(3.46) -0.164***(3.34) -0.158***(3.37) -0.160***(3.27) -0.171***(3.65) -0.172***(3.59) -0.164***(3.52) -0.165***(3.39) 
HAGE  0.032(0.16) 0.033(0.16) 0.024(0.12) 0.025(0.12) 0.059(0.30) 0.059(0.29) 0.034(0.17) 0.036(0.17) 
D_HREAD  -0.007(0.13) -0.001(0.02) -0.015(0.28) -0.010(0.17) -0.003(0.06) 0.001(0.00)  -0.009(0.16) -0.004(0.06) 
D_HPRIM  -0.025(0.36) -0.019(0.25) -0.027(0.38) -0.021(0.28) -0.024(0.34) -0.020(0.26) -0.029(0.41) -0.023(0.30) 
D_HJUN  0.008(0.08) 0.009(0.09) 0.008(0.09) 0.010(0.10) -0.014(0.15) -0.012(0.12) 0.004(0.04) 0.005(0.05) 
D_SREAD -0.076*(1.63)  -0.078(1.56)  -0.072(1.54) -0.074(1.48) -0.077*(1.66)  -0.079(1.61) -0.080*(1.71)  -0.082*(1.63) 
D_SPRIM -0.108*(1.65) -0.114*(1.63) -0.111*(1.69) -0.117*(1.67) -0.104(1.57)  -0.108(1.56) -0.111*(1.69)  -0.117*(1.67) 
HHSIZE -0.016(1.54) -0.016(1.33) -0.015(1.44) -0.015(1.25) -0.019*(1.78)  -0.018(1.59) -0.016(1.55) -0.016(1.34) 
BOYS6 0.071***(2.76)  0.069**(2.38)  0.073***(2.84)  0.071***(2.46) 0.072***(2.83) 0.071***(2.51) 0.065***(2.46) 0.063***(2.15) 
GIRLS6 0.091***(3.30)  0.092***(3.04)  0.092***(3.35)  0.093***(3.08) 0.096***(3.46) 0.096***(3.26) 0.090***(3.27) 0.090***(3.02) 
HHDRAT -0.160(1.08)  -0.145(0.90)  -0.184(1.23) -0.168(1.04) -0.178(1.19) -0.167(1.06) -0.157(1.06) -0.143(0.89) 
HHFARM  0.037(0.81) 0.040(0.79) 0.037(0.80) 0.040(0.77) 0.022(0.48) 0.025(0.49) 0.040(0.86) 0.042(0.82) 
HHCRED -0.062*(1.63) -0.071*(1.72) -0.063*(1.64) -0.071*(1.73) -0.054(1.41)  -0.060(1.48) -0.062*(1.63)  -0.070*(1.71) 
Log-
likelihood 
-578.7795 -577.7877 -577.2767 -576.3834 -575.3922 -574.9387 -578.2313 -577.3503 
Wald 
chi2(26) 
 112.6   114.71   120.72   113.82 
Pseudo  R2  0.1079   0.1102   0.1131   0.1087  
- Note: The dependent variable is ‘child worked at least one session=1 if yes, else 0’. Marginal effects are reported. |t| are shown in parentheses. Regressions also 
included district and round dummies. Illiterate heads and spouses are the excluded educational categories. Random effects are at the household level.  
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Table 3: ZINB estimates of number of child labor sessions 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
D_HDIED -0.509*(1.76)       
D_MDIED   -0.130(1.36)     
D_ILAC       -0.177(1.57)   
D_PEVNT       0.070(0.93) 
D_CFEM 0.070(1.02)  0.080(1.15)  0.086(1.24)  0.076(1.09) 
CAGE 0.057***(2.53)  0.055**(2.43)  0.053**(2.37)  0.054**(2.37) 
D_CSOD -0.016(0.16)  -0.028(0.28)  -0.011(0.11)  -0.014(0.14) 
D_CPRIM -0.234**(2.40)  -0.223**(2.28) -0.213**(2.18) -0.227**(2.32) 
HHFAEQ 0.006(1.00)  0.007(1.06)  0.006(0.98)  0.007(1.03) 
HHLAND 0.045*(1.70)  0.042(1.56)  0.044*(1.65)  0.043(1.62) 
D_HFEM -0.026(0.25)  -0.026(0.25)  -0.057(0.54)  -0.048(0.46) 
HAGE 0.004(1.01)  0.004(1.00)  0.004(1.05)  0.004(1.03) 
D_HREAD -0.052(0.53)  -0.065(0.65)  -0.053(0.53)  -0.055(0.55) 
D_HPRIM 0.076(0.57)  0.066(0.50)  0.067(0.50)  0.063(0.47) 
D_HJUN 0.099(0.56)  0.107(0.61)  0.095(0.54)  0.114(0.65) 
D_SREAD -0.031(0.35)  -0.029(0.32)  -0.022(0.24)  -0.036(0.41) 
D_SPRIM -0.018(0.14)  -0.022(0.17)  -0.008(0.06)  -0.022(0.17) 
HHSIZE -0.032(1.41)  -0.031(1.37)  -0.034(1.49)  -0.032(1.41) 
BOYS6 0.100(1.61)  0.113*(1.78)  0.100(1.59)  0.095(1.48) 
GIRLS6 0.056(1.02)  0.060(1.10)  0.057(1.04)  0.055(1.00) 
HHDRAT -0.670*(1.83)  -0.757**(2.04) -0.739**(1.99) -0.724**(1.96) 
HHFARM -0.091(0.92)  -0.094(0.95)  -0.122(1.22)  -0.098(0.98) 
HHCRED 0.072(0.97)  0.076(1.03)  0.083(1.12)  0.080(1.07) 
Log-likelihood -1451.931  -1452.654  -1452.329  -1453.162 
LR chi2(26)  118.47  117.02  117.67  116.01 
LR test α=0, chi2(1)  7.74 8.42 8.11 8.37 
Vuong (z)  5.41  5.25  5.25  5.35 
- Note: |t| are shown in parentheses. Regressions also included district and round dummies. Illiterate heads 
and spouses are the excluded educational categories. The likelihood ratio test is ZIP versus ZINB, where 
ZINB nests ZIP and α= is the dispersion/variance parameter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 